The African Union (AU) and, indeed, the entire international community have been watching the situation in Egypt with unease since the July 3 unconstitutional removal of President Mohamed Morsi by an amorphous ruling council consisting of defence minister Abdul Fatah al-Sisi; opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei; Grand Imam of Al Azhar, Ahmed el-Tayeb; and Coptic Pope, Tawadros II.
President Adly Mansour and Vice President Mohamed ElBaradei have since taken charge of the administration of the country in acting capacity. No matter the logic the unlawful removal of Morsi from office is wrapped with, the military-backed conspiracy is a brazen subversion of the popular will of the Egyptian people.
We, therefore, agree with the AU that Morsi's government was toppled through a military coup. Morsi ascended to power on June 24, 2012 after defeating his rival, Ahmed Shafik, the last prime minister of the Hosni Mubarak era with 51.7 percent of popular vote in a run-off election. He thus became the first democratically elected head of state in Egyptian history, as opposed to his predecessors who came to power as 'revolutionaries'.
The first sign of trouble manifested in November 2012 when Morsi gave himself fleeting powers, including authority to legislate without judicial oversight or review of his acts, purportedly to protect the nation from what he christened as the Mubarak-era power structure. This immediately attracted massive protests from the people.
His below par handling of the nation's economy as manifested in severe fuel shortages and electricity outages exacerbated the tense atmosphere and snowballed into mass protests and calls for his resignation across Egypt on June 30, 2013.
That was the opportunity the Egyptian military latched on to activate a premeditated plot to ease Morsi out of power. He was given up to July 3, 2013 to arrest the slide into anarchy or quit; and when he could not restore normalcy to the embattled polity, the military booted him out, allegedly with the tacit support of the West.
It is to be noted, however, that Morsi also undercut himself and his party, and played into the hands of the long-standing opponents of Ikhwan-AlMuslimeen (The Muslim Brotherhood) by being blind to the fact that his victory at the polls was not exclusively the making of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The liberals, who were also part of the revolution that sacked Hosni Mubarak, not only supported Morsi, but were tolerant of a largely religious political movement in government as a convenient alternative to having a despot (Mubarak).
Indeed, since the revolution of 1954 that ousted King Farouk, successive Egyptian leaders have been more or less recruited from the military or sustained by the military.
For failing to fully appreciate the dynamics and circumstances of his election, Morsi squandered the goodwill of the majority of the Egyptian electorate whose primary concern was obvious – to terminate the despotism of the military.
He, in addition, rubbished the prospects and promises inherent in the Muslim Brotherhood as a formidable, populist movement to lead political change in Egypt.
Perhaps worthy of mention is the fact that in the 90 years of existence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a mass movement, the election of Morsi was one of the most spectacular achievements of the organisation some of whose leading members have remained steadfast and endured all forms of official repression, imprisonment, disbandment and confiscation of its assets, censorship of its publications and even assassinations.
Under all manner of tribulations in the hands of militarybacked governments in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood remained and still remains, perhaps, the most organised political opposition platform with solid public welfare programmes which endeared it to the ordinary Egyptian.
Morsi may therefore be rightly accused of wasting almost a century of goodwill earned by a party the West would never have wished to have access to, let alone taste power in Egypt.
Morsi having played into the hands of his 'foes', the AU should quickly find a realistic African response to tie Egypt's cohesion and stave the country away from the horrifying experiences in Sudan, Somalia and the rest. Egypt must not be allowed to be torn to shreds, aided by vested foreign political interests.
All stakeholders in the Egyptian project should reassess their positions and be ready to 'give and take' in the larger interest of Egypt, its citizens and Africa.
